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Introduction
In theory, the maximization of  fi scal revenue is the main administrative goal of  any 
government  of  any country in any period. It is no doubt that tax evasion has weak-
ened the government’s tax and lowered the ability of  government to provide public 
goods. Additionally, the tax evasion also causes some other problems being adverse 
to the economic development. For example, the tax evasion distorts the tax system, 
increasing the deadweight loss. While increasing the government’s law enforcement 
costs, it also reduces the government tax revenue and the ability to repay. Therefore, 
to study the  determinants of  tax evasion is very important for us.
Allingham and Sandmo1 set up the Expected Utility Maximization Model based 
on the assumption of  rational man. They made theoretical analysis of  the system of  
tax evasion, the study of  tax evasion had become popular ever since then. Generally 
speaking, punishment and the audit rate are the main determinants of  tax evasion 
for most countries. Lower rates tends to have incentive effects on tax evasion. But 
it does not reduce tax evasion in reality.
James Alm2 pointed out that the average of  the tax inspection rate had been 
below 1%, according to A-S model, under such a low tax rate, most people would 
choose tax evasion, however, the tax compliance was not low in reality. Though 
facing economic stimulus of  reporting lower income, some inner honest taxpayers 
were also willing to bear all the taxes. So A-S model cannot explain the tax confu-
sion phenomenon. In fact, A-S model makes the income endogenous by adding 
the labor supply. Law measures such as increasing the punishment amount and 
the audit rate may reduce the effective wage rate, reducing the total labor supply. 
However, if  the labor supply curve bends backward, additional execution cost may 
1  M.G. Allingham, A. Sandmo, Income tax evasion: A theoretical analysis, “Journal of  Public Eco-
nomics” 1972, 1, pp. 323–338.
2 J. Alm, G.H. McClelland, W.D. Schulze, Why do people pay taxes?, “Journal of  Public Econom-
ics” 1992, 48, pp. 21–48.
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actually increase labor supply and the amount of  unreported income. Risk aversion 
may also interact with labor supply, leading the lower tax compliance.
Many scholars have taken the opportunity of  A-S model to study the problems 
of  the tax evasion. In recent years, with the deepening of  the research, scholars 
have found that conventional deterrence model based on A-S model far can explain 
tax compliance and tax evasion. 
The paper is structured as follows, the following section consists the determi-
nants of  tax evasion, including some economic factors, demographics factors, be-
havior factors. Finally, the main points and results of  the research work are sum-
marized.
Determinants of  tax evasion
The fi rst: Economic factors
Economic factors include income level, sources of  income, marginal tax rate, pun-
ishment amount and inspection rate, etc. Middle-income people are more willing 
to comply with the tax law, because they are worried about the psychological and 
mental punishment, the tax compliance of  high and low income earners is relatively 
low3. The source of  income also infl uences tax evasion. When a country’s labor 
force were mainly engaged in agriculture, small trade volume, then the tax collec-
tion was diffi cult4. Taxpayers engaged in agriculture and self-employed profession-
als were most likely to  evade tax, while taxpayers whose wage and salary needed to 
be paid in advance were most diffi cult to evade tax5. Comparing to public sectors 
who had a motive of  declaration high profi ts, private enterprises were more willing 
to evade tax6.
Some income sources need not declaration in the United States, for example, in-
come from farms or wholly foreign owned enterprises. C omparing to the declared 
less amount of  $289 of  the entire population, statistics of  TCMP in 1988 showed 
that the underreporting income of  the taxpayer of  American farms and sole pro-
prietor reached $1058 and $827 respectively.
3 R. Mason, H. Lowry, An estimate of  income tax evasion in Oregon, Working Paper. Corval-
lis, Oregon: Survey Research Center, Oregon State University 1981.
4 G. Schmölders, Survey research in public fi nance: A behavioral approach to fi scal theory, “Public Fi-
nance” 1970, 25, pp. 300–306.
5 I.G. Wallschutzky, Possible causes of  tax evasion, “Journal of  Economic Psychology” 1984, 5, 
pp. 371–384.
6 M. Hanlon, L. Mills, J. Slemrod, An empirical examination of  corporate tax noncompliance, [in:] 
Taxing Corporate Income in the 21st Century, eds. A. Auerbach, J. Hines, J. Slemrod, New York 2007, 
pp. 171–210.
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Some low income career may be the source of  non-withholding income, for 
example, the most income of  the taxi drivers and the waitress may come from tips 
and bounty.
 Assuming that the taxpayers’ behavior comply to von Neumann-Morgenstern 
rational axiom conditions under the condition of  uncertainty, a person’s preferenc-
es could be expressed by VNM utility function7. Rational consumers would game 
on the expected utility maximization, the individuals traded off  on the tax evasion 
and being caught and punished. Taxpayers were worried about that if  they not fully 
declared their income, they might be caught and punished. When tax offi cials did 
not seize the omission of  income, the taxpayers paid taxes only according to the 
declaration of  the estimated income tax. But when tax offi cials seized the under-
reporting income, in addition to make a supplementary payment of  the tax, they 
must pay the fi nes estimated according to the omission reports of  their income. 
The results of   A-S model showed that if  the government increased inspection rate 
or fi ne rate, the declared amount of  the taxpayer would be increased, the amount 
of  unpaid and tax evasion would be reduced. Yitzhaki argued that the tax rate in 
A-S model had the substitution effect and income effect. Increasing the tax rate 
would increase marginal benefi t of  tax evasion and omission reports of  income, so 
the substitution effect increased the rates of  tax evasion However, increasing the 
tax rate also reduced the taxpayer’s wealth and omission reports of  income, so the 
income effect would reduce the rates of  tax evasion, therefore the net effect was 
uncertain.
Cowell and Gordon8 assuming that the tax authorities estimated fi nes according 
to the tax evaders’ leakage income, through the limitation of  the budget balance, 
making tax evaders although benefi t from unpaid tax, but also facethe loss of  inter-
est due to the loss of  reducing the supply of  public product. The results showed 
that the infl uence of  increasing income tax rate to the omission reports of  income 
depended on the relative result of  the increase of  marginal benefi t due to higher tax 
rate, substitution effect du e to the omission reports of  income and the decrease of  
the wealth of  the taxpayers and the omission reports of  income.
Tittle and Logan pointed out that the belief  of  taxpayers fear and the probability 
of  being certainly punished were more important than sanctions itself. Any mea-
surement of  deterrent effect on the current tax law enforcement practice must in-
clude a possibility of  faith of  audit. Werner W. Pommerehne and Hannelore Weck-
Hannemann9 argued that the tax evasion had positive correlation with marginal 
rate of  tax and the rate of  infl ation, negative correlation with the inspection rate. 
7 M.G. Allingham, A. Sandmo, Income tax evasion…
8 F.A. Cowell, J.P.F. Gordon, Unwillingness to pay: Tax evasion and public good provision, “Journal of  
Public Economics” 1988, 36, pp. 305–321.
9 W.W. Pommerehne, H. Weck-Hannemann, Tax Rates, Tax Administration and Income Tax Eva-
sion in Switzerland, “Public Choice” 1996, 88 (1–2), pp. 161–170.
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When the taxpayer could be directly involved in making the government budget, the 
phenomenon of  tax evasion would signifi cantly reduce, instead, opposite.
In short, economic factors, literature concentrated on the level and source of  
income, marginal tax rate, punishment. But scholars far more reached a consensus 
on these factors that tax evasion had positive or negative correlation, because of  the 
complexity of  phenomenon of  the tax evasion (far from simple, easy to explain as 
economic theory predicts).
The second: Demographics factors
Demographic factors mainly included factors such as age, gender and education. 
Age and gender were closely linked to the taxpayers’ income levels and careers, they 
were important factors affecting the tax evasion. Older people were more likely to 
gain income from the non-withholding resources. For instance, TCMP statistics 
showed that the average level of  compliance of  married and over 65 were signifi -
cantly higher than unmarried and under the age of  65. Men had more advantages 
than women to get those non-withholding professions. Women were mostly en-
gaged in traditional professions, such as nurses, teachers, laboratory technicians, 
clerks, sales work or employes in the service industry. The salary was generally go-
ing to be paid in advance in these industries10. Age and gender had independent 
infl uence on tax compliance. Sutherland and Cressey11 pointed out that the criminal 
behavior was committed more of  the body strong and young people. But there’s no 
clear whether this explanation was also adapted to the white-collar crime. Chrono-
logical age was the most important determinants of  tax evasion12. The old had 
higher tax compliance than senior young13. Young people were mostly chasing risk, 
less sensitive to punish rate. The increase of  the tax rate led taxpayers to be more 
poor and loss. Therefore, taxpayers sought to take more risk, decreasing the level 
of  tax compliance14.
10 M.A. Ferber, H.M. Lowry, The Sex Differential in Earnings: A Reappraisal, “Industrial and La-
bor Relations Review” 1976, 29, pp. 377–387.
11 E.H. Sutherland, D.R. Cressey, Criminology, 8th ed., Philadelphia 1970.
12 B.R. Jackson, V.C. Milliron, Tax compliance research: Findings, problems and prospects, “Journal of  
Accounting Literature” 1986, 5, pp. 125–165.
13 C. Tittle, Sanctions and social deviance: The question of  deterrence, New York 1980; A.D. Witte, 
D.F. Woodbury, The effects of  tax laws and tax administration on tax compliance: The case of  the U.S. 
individual income tax, “National Tax Journal” 1985, 38, pp. 1–13; J.A. Dubin, L.L. Wilde, An empiri-
cal analysis of  federal income tax auditing and compliance, “National Tax Journal” 1988, 41, pp. 61–74; 
J.S. Feinstein, An econometric analysis of  income tax evasion and its detection, “RAND Journal of  Eco-
nomics” 1991, 22, pp. 14–35; D.M. Hanno, G.R. Violette, An analysis of  moral and social infl uences 
on tax behavior, “Behavioral Research in Accounting” 1996, 8, pp. 57–75.
14 S. Dhami, A. al-Nowaihi, Why do people pay taxes? Prospect theory versus expected utility theory, 
“Journal of  Economic Behavior & Organization” 2007, 64 (1), pp. 171–192.
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The taxpayers’ behavior was often far more complicated than the forecast of  
economic theory, which was the cause that traditional models can’t fully explain. 
Sometimes, for example, tax compliance depended on the framing effect. In reality, 
for the same tax decision problem, because of  the different methods of  description, 
taxpayers showed the different risk preference and made different tax decision. The 
same question that two logical meaning similar claims had led to the different judg-
ments. Under the positive framework, people tended to risk-averse preference for 
gains, while under the negative framework, people tended to risk-seeking preference 
for losses. Even if  men and women had received the objective equivalence informa-
tion, females had stronger willingness to comply with the information of  communi-
cation framework of  positive persuading than the negative framework information, 
while males responded better to the information of  communication framework of  
negative positive persuading than the positive framework information15.
The level of  the tax compliance of  the women was higher than men16. With 
the development of  women’s liberation movement, the gap of  the tax compliance 
between men and women was narrowing17. However, since the research of  Jackson 
and Milliron18 studies had shown that the gap of  the tax compliance between men 
and women still maintained19. Education on the impact of  tax evasion was mainly 
including two aspects, with the increase of  knowledge for tax evasion, people re-
ceived a good education thought that the odds of  tax evasion being caught were 
small, increasing the tax non compliance. The other was the education deepening 
the knowledge of  the general level of  fi nancial knowledge, improving the tax com-
pliance20. General education presented negative correlation with tax evasion.
For a long time, it was diffi cult to obtain demographic data, the demographic 
factors tended to be ignored, research in this fi eld was less. However, in recent years, 
many scholars used the data from TCMP or their own survey to study how demo-
graphic factors affected tax evasion, founding some interesting conclusions not ex-
pected before, enriching the research contents of  the determinants of  tax evasion.
15 J. Hasseldine, P.A. Hite, Framing, gender and tax compliance, “Journal of  Economic Psychology” 
2003, 24, pp. 517–533.
16 J. Vogel, Taxation and Public Opinion in Sweden: An Interpretation of  Recent Survey Data, “National 
Tax Journal” 1974, 27, pp. 499–513; R. Mason, L. Calvin, A study of  admitted income tax evasion, 
“Law and Society Review” 1978, 12, pp. 73–89.
17 B.R. Jackson, V.C. Milliron, Tax compliance research…
18 Ibidem.
19 N. Brooks, A.H. Doob, Tax evasion: Searching for a theory of  compliant behavior, [in:] Securing 
compliance: Seven case studies, ed. M.L. Friedland, Toronto 1990, pp. 120–164; J.H. Collins, V.C. 
Milliron, D.R. Toy, Determinants of  tax compliance: A contingency approach, “Journal of  the American 
Taxation Association” 1992, 14, pp. 1–29.
20 B.R. Jackson, V.C. Milliron, Tax compliance research…
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The third: Behavior factors
Behavior factors mainly included tax fairness, the complexity of  tax system, taxpay-
ers’ understanding of  the tax authorities, social customs and tax moral, etc. Spicer, 
Song and Yarbrough found an obvious negative relationship between tax fairness 
and tax evasion21. Tax fairness and the perception of  the improvement to tax sys-
tem had obvious correlations, tax fairness and tax evasion had negative correla-
tion22. People were willing to pay taxes, when the tax authorities or the measures 
were fair. Southern Europe were trying to improve tax compliance by strengthening 
law enforcement for a long time in history, however, these countries had the lowest 
tax compliance in Europe23. The more understanding of  taxpayers to tax authori-
ties, the lower the tax evasion would be24. Individuals responded differently, when 
facing gains and losses. Kahneman and Tversky argued that the basis of  individual 
responding was the value function rather than utility function in economic model25. 
Value function did not change with the income level itself, but it changed with the 
changing of  the reference point of  income level, value function to be steeper to 
benefi ciaries than to losers, as compared with the same income, people hate more 
losses, for benefi ciaries it was concave (risk aversion), but convex for losers (risk-
seeking), so when individuals at risk and had the opportunity to game, they would 
show risk aversion behavior. Conversely, when the same individuals were facing 
speculation and may suffer from losses, they became a risk lover. The assumptions 
about tax compliance were subtle and powerful. Tax was a kind of  loss for indi-
vidual, the individual was likely to show a kind of  pursuit of  risk behavior, that was 
to say, these individuals declared less income than the expected utility theory model 
had predicted.
Complex tax system would only  led companies employing tax advisers to slip 
through, and led enterprises steadfast competition and focusing on their business to 
be disadvantage. So keeping the simplicity of  tax rules was important. Strict assess-
ment and implement policies would increase the social costs, but a less strict and 
loose policy might encourage taxpayers and tax authority to cooperate to perform 
the cumbersome tax payment procedures. In addition, the tax rules once revised, 
21 M.W. Spicer, A behavioral model of  income tax evasion, unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Ohio State 
University 1974; Y.D. Song, T.E. Yarbrough, Tax ethics and tax attitudes: A survey, “Public Admin-
istration Review” 1978, 38, pp. 442–452.
22 A. Hite, M.L. Roberts, An analysis of  tax reform based on taxpayers’ perceptions of  fairness and self-
interest, “Advances in Taxation”1992, 4, pp. 115–137.
23 B.R. Jackson, V.C. Milliron, Tax compliance research…
24 I.G. Wallschutzky, Possible causes…; S. Klepper, D. Nagin, The anatomy of  tax evasion, “Journal 
of  Law, Economics and Organization”1989, 5, pp. 1–24; N. Brooks, A.H. Doob, Tax evasion…
25 D. Kahneman, A. Tversky, Prospect theory: An analysis of  decision under risk, “Econometrica” 
1979, 47, pp. 263–291.
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stop tinkering, the faulty practice had led large discounts of  all the efforts of  trying 
to make the tax laws more rational.
Self  assessment tax system reduced the understanding between taxpayers and 
tax authorities, while increasing the rate of  the tax evasion26. Although a lot of  peo-
ple had doubts about the injustice of  the tax law, considering the provisions of  the 
tax law, tax evasion would be punished or worried about once tax evasion released, 
they would make a loss of  the reputation or on moral good faith principle, even if  
they had doubts about tax fairness, they also dared not  to evade tax, which might be 
the cause that tax cognitive could not explain the reasons for tax evasion behavior. 
Some countries set the auditing and punishment level very low so that rational in-
dividuals to evade tax, however, we still could see a high degree of  tax compliance. 
Noting that tax compliance could not be completely explained by law enforcement 
level. In addition to the auditing and punishment, the researchers began to analysis 
the other determinants of  tax evasion, tax moral was one of  the important factors. 
Tax moral was the individual’s willingness to pay tax, moral obligation or their con-
tribution to society through tax. Tax moral also included regret and guilt due to tax 
evasion, the more regret and guilt of  taxpayers’, the stronger he was willing to pay 
taxes. Religious belief  was the potential determinant of  tax moral and the intrinsic 
motivation people paying taxes. We often used the church attendance, religious edu-
cation and whether an active member of  the church or religious groups to analyze 
the measure of  religious belief. Even in other factors under control, such as corrup-
tion, integrity, demographic and economic factors, the empirical results showed that 
the religion was also a positive determinant of  tax compliance.
By the empirical study, Spicer, Spicer and Lundstedt, Tittle, Riahi-Belka-oiu, 
concluded that countries’ tax evasion had negative correlation with the determi-
nants of  tax moral27. Tax compliance was connected with laborers market behavior. 
Different professions might have different degree of  tax evasion, that is to say, tax 
evasion was correlated with wage and tax bracket, it could affect people’s career 
choices, human capital investment and labor supply. Social norms was a kind of  
behavior patterns that others were easy to judge, maintained by its license and not 
permission of  the society. Although it was diffi cult to defi ne, social norms could 
26 V. Tanzi, Policies, institutions and the dark side of  economics, Cheltenham, UK 2000; T.K. Sarker, 
Improving tax compliance in developing countries via self-assessment systems. What could Bangladesh learn from 
Japan?, “Asia-Pacifi c Tax Bulletin” 2003, 9, pp. 170–176; B. Torgler, K. Murphy, Tax morale in 
Australia: What shapes it and has it changed over time?, “Journal of  Australian Taxation” 2004, 7, pp. 
298–335.
27 M.W. Spicer, A behavioral model…; M. Spicer, S. Lundstedt, Understanding tax evasion, “Public 
Finance” 1976, 31 (2), pp. 295–305; C. Tittle, Sanctions and social deviance: The question of  deterrence, 
New York 1980; A. Riahi-Belkaoiu, Relationship between tax compliance internationally and selected deter-
minants of  tax morale, “Journal of  International Accounting, Auditing and Taxation” 2004, 13, pp. 
135–143.
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distinguish through the individual rationality to the process rather than the result. 
Generally speaking, social norms and social customs, tax moral, patriotism, altru-
ism, moral sense, guilt were the same. As long as the individual felt his behavior 
was conforming to the norms of  the society, he would not have to evade taxes. Tax 
moral was the internalization of  social norms, it increased the cost of  tax evasion28.
Traxler examined A-S model with tax moral, the empirical results showed that 
the willingness of  taxpayers’ tax fraud depended on the behavior of  their fellow 
citizens29. If  their friends and other residents paid taxes, the more they were willing 
to pay taxes. The more people of  tax evasion, the more they would tend to think 
that their hidden income was reasonable. In this regard, the individual decision was 
depended on each other. Taxpayers were conditional cooperators, they conditioned 
on the other members paying taxes for the society. For example, when they knew 
the exact data of  the other honest taxpayers paying taxes, they were more likely to 
be honest and pay tax.
Putting the hypothesis of  economic’s limited rationality into research framework 
of  tax evasion, considering the determinants of  tax evasion, more in line with the 
reality, better explained the behavior of  tax evasion of  the people. The research 
space in the fi eld was very big, needed to be focused on in the future.
Conclusion and Enlightenment
Tax evasion is one of  the important research issues of  public economics. Indeed, 
there are many reasons for emphasizing the importance of  it, but the most obvious 
is that it reduces the tax revenue and lowers public service provided to the taxpayers 
according to the law. In addition, the individual changes their behavior to tax fraud, 
for example, changing the work time, professional entry and risk bearing, etc., so as 
to make the optimal allocation of  resources unreasonable under the condition of  
the market. The unequal distribution opportunity due to tax evasion has wrought 
havoc on the tax lateral fair, leading the production invalid, unfair distribution of  
tax burden between companies. Tax evasion also enables the government to spend 
resources auditing, measuring the tax evasion, punishing tax evaders. Tax evasion 
causes additional loss and increases tax compliance cost.
If  you want to design a suitable policy to ensure tax compliance, it is necessary 
to examine carefully the motivation of  taxpayers to comply with the tax law. In 
recent years, a large amountof  literature have studied tax evasion, but most of  the 
28 J. Elster, Social norms and economic theory, “Journal of  Economic Perspectives” 1989, 3, pp. 
99–117.
29 C. Traxler, Social norms and conditional cooperative taxpayers, “European Journal of  Political 
Economy” 2010, 26 (1), pp. 89–103.
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scholars investigated the problem from the economy fi eld. Therefore, in addition 
to focusing on the traditional economic determinants of  tax evasion, we should 
actively explore the non-economic factors such as demographic and behavioral. 
Scholars should use empirical analysis method to study tax compliance from mul-
tiple perspectives such as cultural, tax fairness and tax moral. Then, we can be more 
comprehensive understanding determinants of  tax evasion, enhancing citizens’ tax 
consciousness, improving citizens’ tax compliance. At the same time, the author 
think that studying the determinants of  tax evasion in detail also have some certain 
theoretical value and practical signifi cance for studying tax, offi cials’ tax law en-
forcement and tax practice in the future.
STRESZCZENIE
DETERMINANTY UNIKANIA OPODATKOWANIA – 
PRZEGLĄD LITERATURY 
Zgodnie z tradycyjną teorią sankcje i poziom audytu stanowią główne przyczyny uchylania 
się od opodatkowania, a zwiększenie kar i zmniejszanie audytu zmniejsza ilość przypad-
ków uchylania się od opodatkowania. Jednak rzeczywistość jest daleka od tego. W artyku-
le wyjaśniono zjawisko unikania opodatkowania za pomocą efektu ramki z perspektywy 
teorii. Wiek, płeć i moralność podatkowa stanowią ważne determinanty uchylania się od 
opodatkowania i odgrywają dużą rolę. Naukowcy nie osiągnęli porozumienia, jakie kon-
kretnie czynniki odgrywają dominującą rolę w przypadku uchylania się od opodatkowania. 
Jak dotąd najbardziej spójne są te poglądy w kręgach akademickich, w których wskazuje się, 
że czynniki pozaekonomiczne mają większy wpływ na uchylanie się od opodatkowania niż 
czynniki ekonomiczne.
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